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I
INTRODUCTION

This article considers the work of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law in the field of civil litigation, focusing particularly on the
Service Convention and the Evidence Convention. It discusses the most
important issues of interpretation and application that have arisen under these
two conventions. It notes that the Hague Conference has made a significant
international contribution to the process of international civil litigation through
these conventions. It concludes that the international community has benefitted
from the work of the Conference through cooperation under its auspices,
leading toward solutions of procedural problems in international litigation and
resulting in the facilitation of international service of process and international
discovery.
II
WHAT IS CIVIL PROCEDURE?

In the broadest sense, civil procedure constitutes the principles and rules
which control the judicial resolution of civil disputes. Civil procedure is found
in many places-codes, court rules, court decisions, generally accepted
practices-but only to a very limited extent in multilateral international
conventions or bilateral international arrangements.
With the development of the centralized state and the emergence of national
court systems, the sovereign's writ ran throughout the land. It did not, however,
run beyond the territorial boundaries of the kingdom. The territorial focus of
sovereignty made it inevitable that civil procedure would develop on a national
rather than an international basis.
This development led to diversity, inconsistencies, and, in some instances,
incompatibilities among the civil procedures of states having trading and other
commercial relations. The areas of service of process and evidence may be
taken as examples. In the United States, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allow service by mail; this type of service, however, is not recognized in many
countries that have important commercial relations with the United States. In
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the area of evidence, the differences are even more pronounced. Pretrial
discovery, which most U.S. litigators accept as one of the inalienable rights of
man, is largely unknown outside of U.S. courts. Indeed, the basic roles of the
advocate and the judiciary in the gathering and presentation of evidence differ
widely among national judicial systems.
Thus, in the two most important procedural areas to which the Hague
Conference has addressed itself to date-the commencement of litigation and
the gathering and presentation of evidence in court-inconsistencies and
incompatibilities have existed between the practice of the United States and
countries such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.
III
THE HAGUE CONFERENCE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE

The Hague Conference's most important contributions to cooperation in civil
procedure in international litigation are the Convention on the Service Abroad
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (the
"Service Convention") 1 and the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
in Civil or Commercial Matters (the "Evidence Convention").2 This article
presents some reflections on the benefits which the international community
derives from these Conventions.
A.

The Service Convention

Litigation traditionally begins with the service of process. As a general
proposition, service is important in two respects. First, it may confer jurisdiction
in some cases, and, second, it functions to give notice of the nature and venue
of the case to the defendant.
Different national systems provide for different modes of service. For
example, the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that
service in a foreign country may be made "by any form of mail, requiring a
signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the
party to be served," 3 and that domestic service may be made "by mailing a
copy of the summons and of the complaint . . . to the person to be served,
together with two copies of a notice and acknowledgement ... and a return
envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the sender."4 Service by mail is

1. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, art. 2, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163
[hereinafter Hague Service Convention].
2. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for
signature Mar. 18, 1970, art. 2, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague Evidence
Convention].
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1).
4. Id. at 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). This type of service is not effective unless an acknowledgement of service
is received by the sender within 20 days after the date of mailing.
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generally not recognized by other jurisdictions for the purposes of either
domestic or foreign service.'
1. The Objective of the Service Convention. The Service Convention entered
into force on February 10, 1969. As of the beginning of 1992, twenty-nine
countries were parties to the Convention, and two others had signed but not yet
ratified the Convention. States party to the Convention presently include,
among others, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.'
The preamble to the Service Convention declares the desire of the
signatories "to ensure that judicial and extrajudicial documents to be served
abroad shall be brought to the notice of the addressee in sufficient time" and
"to improve the organisation of mutual judicial assistance for that purpose."7
Certainly, these are laudatory objectives. Moreover, in their implementation,
Articles 15 and 16 of the Convention establish protections for the citizens and
residents of the signatories who are subject to service. Article 15 codifies the
general concept that notice sufficient to afford an opportunity to defend is an
essential element of due process of law, a concept which is found in both
customary international law and the Constitution of the United States. In
essence, it provides that a default judgment shall not be entered against a
nonappearing defendant unless (a) service has been properly made pursuant to
the internal laws of the state of service or (b) actual delivery to the defendant
or his residence of the document in question has been made by a method
provided by the Convention in sufficient time to enable the defendant to
defend.' Article 16 provides for relief to a nonappearing defendant who can
show that, without any fault on his part, he did not have knowledge of a writ
of summons in sufficient time to defend or knowledge of a judgment in
sufficient time to appeal. 9
The Service Convention creates a system of service of judicial process-available to litigants in the courts of all of its signatory states-which
allows effective service and, at the same time, affords the protection of due
process as defined in Article 16. Therefore, the Service Convention provides
a codified (and thus reasonably ascertainable), fair, and internationally
recognized system for the initiation of litigation. The benefit which this affords
the world community will, of course, grow with additional ratifications of the
Convention.

5. Germany and Japan are examples of such jurisdictions.
6. TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1992, at 341 [hereinafter TREATIES IN FORCE]. The
other states party to the Service Convention are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Botswana, Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia (which has since split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Denmark, Egypt, Finland,
Greece, Israel, Luxembourg, Malawi, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Seychelles, and Turkey. Id.
7. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, at 362.
8. Id. at 364.
9. Id.
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2. Does the Convention or Local Law Control Where Service is Made on a
Domestic Agent? The question has arisen, in the context of service in the
United States upon a subsidiary of a foreign corporation in an effort to serve
the parent corporation, whether the effectiveness of such service is governed by
the Convention or by local law. In Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Schlunk,t° the United States Supreme Court decided that such service was
domestic service completed within the forum state and governed by local law."
Since the applicable Illinois law'2 did not require the transmission of any
judicial document for "service abroad," the Convention did not apply. The
majority also noted that the Convention was a viable alternative to the use of
domestic methods of service in that it provides a "simple and certain means by
which to serve process on a foreign national."'" The choice of such a means
would eliminate any uncertainty as to the controlling law, and would result in
the protections of Articles 15 and 16 being available to the party being served.
The three concurring justices in Schlunk disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the service made in Illinois was not "service abroad" within the
meaning of Article 1, and, therefore, determined that the Convention controlled. 4 Their disagreement was based on the general purposes of the
Convention and its negotiating history. In particular, Justice Brennan noted the
discussions concerning the civil law procedure of "notification au parquet,"
which permits service of process upon a local official, who is then supposed, but
not required, to transmit the document abroad through diplomatic or other
channels.15 This procedure does not assure that the defendant will receive
timely actual notice of the pending lawsuit. Consequently, "notification au
parquet" is generally viewed as inconsistent with the standards of due process.
The concurring justices concluded that the desire of the Tenth Hague
Conference to eliminate "notification au parquet" required that the Convention
ability to deem service 'domestic,' thereby
be interpreted to limit the "forum's
16
terms."'
Convention
the
avoiding
The difference between the majority and concurring opinions in Schlunk
rests in their views of the applicability of Articles 15 and 16. Those Articles
provide for relief to a defendant against whom a judgment has been entered
who did not have "sufficient time to enable [him] to defend."' 7 However, if
the service in question was "domestic service" rather than "service abroad," the
protection afforded by Articles 15 and 16 would not be available, and the
defendant would have to seek relief under the due process concepts of the

10. 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
11. Id. at 707 ("Where service on a domestic agent is valid and complete under both state law and
the Due Process Clause, our inquiry ends and the Convention has no further implications.").
12. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 1 2-209(a)(1) (1985).
13. Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. at 706.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., id. at 709-10.
16. Id. at 714.
17. Hague Service Convention, supra note 1, at 364.
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applicable domestic laws. This is clearly an unsatisfactory situation, which could
be cured by revising the Convention to make Articles 15 and 16 applicable
whenever the party effecting service could have used the Convention procedure.
Alternatively, the Convention could be interpreted to prohibit the use of
"dcmestic service" unless the service afforded by the domestic procedure is
generally equivalent, in terms of the probability of the defendant receiving
proper notice, to the forms of service prescribed by the Convention.
3. Does Article 10 of the Convention Allow Service of Process to be Made by
Mail? Another subject of litigation in the United States has been the question
whether Article 10 of the Convention allows service of process by mail in the
absence of an objection by the country where the mail is to be delivered. This
problem arises from the language of Article 10(a), which provides that, in the
absence of such an objection, the Convention shall not interfere with "the
freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons
abroad.""8 The ambiguity resides in the use of the verb "to send" rather than
"to serve," the argument being that the use of the former implicitly prohibits the
"service" of documents by mail. There is a conflict among the federal courts of
appeals on this question. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held in Ackermann v. Levine 9 that such service of process is allowed;
meanwhile, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held to
the contrary in Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp.2"
The existence of a conflict between circuit courts is a significant basis on
which the United States Supreme Court exercises its certiorari jurisdiction.
Thus, it is not unreasonable to anticipate that this issue will be decided by the
Court in the not-too-distant future when an appropriate case presents itself. It
is the present position of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference that
Article 10(a) does permit service of process by mail:
The view that Article 10(a) does not allow service of process by mail is,
so far as we know at the Permanent Bureau, entirely contrary to the historical
interpretation of the 1965 Convention as well as the similar language (in
French only) in its predecessors, the 1954 Convention on Civil Procedure and
the 1905 Convention on Civil Procedure. The idea that the Convention
permits service of process by mail, not merely sending of documents, was
implicit in the conclusions of the Special Commission which met in November
1977 to consider the operation of this Convention, as well as of the Special
Commission of April 1989, which met to consider the operation of both
Conventions. Service of process by mail under the Convention has also been
upheld by courts in Belgium and we at the Permanent Bureau are not aware

18. Id. at 363.
19. 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986).
20. 889 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1989).

For a summary of decisions dealing with this question, see
1965

PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE OPERATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 15 NOVEMBER

ON SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL
MATTERS 42-45 (2d ed. 1992).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 57: No. 3

of any case, except in the United States, where a court has held that the
Convention does not allow service of process by mail abroad."

Although uncertainty as to service by mail may remain, the Convention
provides for a procedure which eliminates the question. Instead of serving by
mail, the person desiring service may make use of the organ for receiving
requests for service, the Central Authority, which each contracting state is
required to designate pursuant to Article 2.
Following the procedures
established by Articles 3 through 7, the Central Authority will either serve the
document itself or arrange to have it served by an appropriate agency. Thus,
the Convention assures a reliable and fair means of service of process, which is
a benefit to parties involved in international litigation within the scope of the
Convention.
B. The Evidence Convention
Evidence is a sine qua non of litigation. In the absence of witnesses and
other sources of evidence, the search for the judicial truth, which is the goal of
litigation, can never be fulfilled. All judicial systems have procedures for the
gathering of evidence and rules governing the presentation of evidence to the
court. These systems, however, cannot operate extraterritorially without the
cooperation or acquiescence of the sovereign of the territory in which the
evidence is sought. When the world was less closely knit, commercially and
financially, than it is today, the absence of any system of international
cooperation for the gathering of evidence was probably of little practical
significance. With the dramatic changes in the structure of international finance
and commerce since the end of World War II, the scene changed and a need for
cooperation emerged.
The final text of the Evidence Convention was prepared at the Eleventh
Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law and was signed
by all of the delegations present on October 26, 1968. The Convention entered
into force on October 7, 1972. Presently, twenty-one states are parties to the
Convention, including Argentina, Mexico, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.22
Whatever service or disservice the Evidence Convention provides for the
international community, one thing is clear: the Convention addresses a
problem of international civil litigation which requires international cooperation.
If all of the relevant evidence could always be provided by the parties to the
litigation, adequate solutions might well be found within national systems of
discovery and trial. A trial court usually has available sanctions which will, if
fully applied, force parties before it to disclose evidence to which they have
access or which is within their control. For example, failure to produce evidence
21. Letter from Adair Dyer, First Secretary, Hague Conference, to the author (June 19, 1992) (on
file with author).
22. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 6, at 341-42. The other states party to the Evidence
Convention are Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia (which has since split into the Czech Republic and
Slovakia), Denmark, Finland, Israel, Luxembourg, Monaco, Norway, Portugal, and Spain. Id.
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required by a U.S. federal court can result in sanctions as serious as entry of
judgment against the offending party.' Whether that power will be exercised
depends upon the specific facts of the case. Where a blocking statute or other
foreign law imposing penalties for the disclosure of the evidence sought exists,
the trial court may decide that the party against whom the order is directed
should not be penalized for noncompliance. The most satisfactory solution to
conflicts of this type between the forum state and the blocking state requires
some mechanism for the impartial weighing of the conflicting interest. No such
mechanism exists today.
Another difficulty arises where evidence is in the control of a nonparty
outside the jurisdiction of the trial court. In the international environment, if
the nonparty controlling the evidence refuses to supply it, then such evidence
cannot be obtained without some type of international cooperation. The
Evidence Convention provides an international approach to securing nonparty
evidence where it is necessary to the proper resolution of civil litigation.2 4
1. The Objective of the Evidence Convention. The preamble to the Evidence
Convention states that the signatory states desire "to facilitate the transmission
and execution of Letters of Request and to further the accommodation of the
different methods which they use for this purpose," and also "to improve mutual
judicial co-operation in civil or commercial matters."25 Chapter I of the
Convention then provides for a regime governing "Letters of Request" to obtain
evidence or to perform some other judicial act.26 Chapter II provides for the
"taking of evidence by diplomatic officers, consular agents and commissioners."27 These procedures are designed to balance the interests of the requesting state and the addressed state. The Convention enumerates specific rights
and protections for witnesses. Whether the evidence is to be taken under
Chapter I (an involuntary procedure) or Chapter II (a voluntary procedure),
Article 11 controls. It gives the witness the same privileges or duties to refuse
to give evidence that he or she may have under the laws of the addressed state
or the laws of the state originating the request. For example, a U.S. citizen
testifying under a Letter of Request from Germany retains his or her
constitutional privilege not to incriminate himself or herself, and acquires any
additional applicable German privilege not found in U.S. law. Thus, the witness
is afforded the total protection of the two relevant legal systems.

23. If a party fails to provide or permit discovery, the trial court may make "[aIn order striking
out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing
the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
party ....
24. See, e.g., In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 615 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the Convention

"is to be employed with the involuntary deposition of a party conducted in a foreign country, and with
the production of documents or other evidence gathered from persons or entities in the foreign country
who are not subject to the court's in personam jurisdiction").
25. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 2, at 2557.
26. Id. at 2557-64.
27. Id. at 2554-65.
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2. Does the Evidence Convention Preempt the Domestic Rule of Civil
Procedure? Between 1985 and 1987, this question was the subject of significant
litigation in the United States. Many European jurisdictions had takenthe
position that the Convention preempted the domestic rule; meanwhile, many
U.S. jurisdictions had taken the opposite position. For the United States, this
question was settled by the Supreme Court's decision in Soci~t9 Nationale
IndustrielleAgrospatiale v. United States District Courtfor the Southern District
of Iowa.28 There, the Court held, unanimously that the Convention does not
provide the exclusive procedure for obtaining documents and information
located in a foreign signatory's territory. The Court also held, by a five-four
majority, that the trial court should make an analysis, similar to that often
undertaken by U.S. courts in deciding choice of law questions, which considers
and endeavors to balance the competing interests to determine which procedure
should be used. The four justices dissenting from the second holding of the
Court reasoned that, as a general rule, there should be a presumption "that, in
most cases, courts should resort first to the Convention procedures."29
In reaching this conclusion, the dissenting justices did not discuss the fact
that the Evidence Convention imposes no obligation upon the state addressed
to accommodate the interests of the forum state by providing evidence which
the trial court may view as essential to the proper resolution of the case before
it.30 For example, blocking statutes or criminal statutes, either preventing or
imposing substantial penalties for disclosure, may very well make first recourse
to the Convention procedure useless. It is nonsensical to force the domestic
party to use a procedure which does not afford a reasonable opportunity of
securing the evidence sought. Perhaps, at some point the Hague Conference
should consider revising the Convention so that the interest of the trial court in
securing relevant evidence can be properly balanced with the addressed state's
interest in the nondisclosure of evidence.
3. Is Such a Revision of the Convention Feasible? It may not be realistic to
seek such a revision before achievement of a sympathetic understanding of
different approaches to discovery and trial, such as those that exist between
common law and civil law jurisdictions. As a practical matter, in many
situations, both the requesting state and the state addressed may have to alter
their domestic practices to strike an appropriate balance between the interests
of the state of trial and the state where the evidence was sought. Such an
accommodation would be more easily achieved if limitations on U.S. discovery
practice were established through changes in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure so that the scope of federal discovery would be more acceptable to
other states. The American Bar and judiciary is now directing substantial
attention to the desirability of such a limitation.
28. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
29. Id. at 547, 548-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30. See generally id. at 547-68.
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In practice, since the Aerospatiale decision, most U.S. courts have applied
the domestic system where evidence is sought from a party Who is subject to the
personal jurisdiction of the court. This result is perhaps inevitable while the
'holding in Aerospatiale remains the controlling law. Unless another approach
.is mandated, both' U.S. judges and U.S. lawyers will opt for the familiar
procedure rather than the relatively unfamiliar Convention procedure."1

The

whole situation could be altered by a change in Rule 26 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Such a change was proposed in the June 1990 recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Standing Committee on

Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
The proposal, which was explicitly based on the dissenting view in Agrospatiale,
was to add to Rule 26(a) the following language:
Discovery at a place within a country having a treaty with the United States
applicable to such discovery shall be conducted by methods authorized by the
treaty unless the court determines that those methods are inadequate or
inequitable
and authorizes other discovery methods prohibited by the
32
treaty.

This recommendation was included in the draft of the Report of the Judicial
Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of September 1992.
The Judicial Conference, however, deleted this proposed amendment in

response "to criticisms from the Departments of State and Justice and from
33
certain foreign governments.
The Report was transmitted to the Chief Justice of the United States on

November 27, 1992, and the proposed amendments, including significant
amendments to Rule 26 mandating disclosure and providing for other significant
changes in that rule, became effective December 1, 1993.'

31. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26.

32. See report by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Standing Committee on Rules
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, dated June 19, 1990. A
somewhat more elaborate change was proposed in a Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dated September
1989. See 127 F.R.D. 237, 317-21 (1990). In an article published shortly before the June 19, 1990,
recommendation, the Honorable Joseph F. Weis, Jr., of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit and Chair of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference had supported the dissenting position in Agrospatiale:
The arguments mustered against giving priority to Convention procedures are not persuasive
when balanced with the overriding interests, national and international, in more effective
implementation of the Evidence Convention. It should be remembered, after all, that the
treaty negotiated by the United States and the other signatories is for the benefit of private
litigants as a whole-some inconvenience or expense to an individual litigant should not suffice
to jeopardize an arrangement which benefits many. Moreover, through ratification, the United
States has agreed to honor the commitments which the treaty contains. The judiciary should
not lightly permit a private litigant to undermine express national policy.
Joseph F. Weis, Jr., The FederalRules of the Hague Conventions: Concerns of Conformity and Comity,
50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 903, 931 (1989).
33. Excerpt from the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 515 (1993).
34. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Amendments to FederalRules of Civil Procedure,146 F.R.D.
401, 401-03, 514 (1993).
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No proposal to amend Rule 26 to give priority to the Evidence Convention
procedure has been presented to the Supreme Court. Whether any such
amendment would ever be proposed by the Judicial Conference and accepted
by the Court will probably be determined within the context of the recent
amendments to Rule 26, providing for required disclosure and comporting with
the general context of the continuing debate as to whether and how to reform
what some view as the oppressive system of federal discovery.
IV
OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

Certain benefits flowing from the Service and Evidence Conventions
specifically relate to international litigation. Before discussing these, a broader
question should be addressed: are there other, more general benefits coming
from the Hague Conference on Private International Law?
One of the difficulties of international litigation has been, and remains, the
fundamental differences among various national systems with regard to the role
of the advocate and the judiciary in securing evidence. A paper which I
delivered in 1983 discussed the perspective of the U.S. private practitioner on
discovery of documents and evidence in a foreign country, and noted that there
were profound differences between the U.S. approach to discovery and those
of the United Kingdom and Italy-the two jurisdictions selected for comparison.35 These differences reside not only in the scope of discovery but also in
the role of the advocate and the judiciary in collecting evidence.36
The work of the Hague Conference has been very useful in developing an
understanding and, to some extent, an accommodation of these differences. The
Evidence Convention rests on the fundamental concept of providing a method
for gathering evidence "'tolerable' to the authorities of the state where it is

35. Robert B. von Mehren, Perspective of the US Private Practitioner,in EXTRATERRITORIAL
194-(Cecil J. Olmstead ed., 1984).
36. These differences were summarized as follows:
The American, English and Italian definitions of these roles constitute something of a
spectrum. At one extreme is the US practice where the judicial role in the discovery
process is supervisory and the lawyers are active and wide-ranging. In the middle is
that of the United Kingdom, where the lawyers play active but subdued roles. At the
other extreme is Italy where the role of evidence-gathering is primarily that of the
judiciary.
Id. at 195-96.
In the Italian system, any step undertaken by a party in the discovery process must be authorized
by the court, which has wide discretion to deny discovery if it is not deemed necessary. Furthermore,
the judge will always be present at the taking of evidence and, as stated above, whenever a party or
witness is examined, the judge will personally conduct the questioning. The inquisitorial nature of the
Italian system and the central role played by the judiciary in collecting evidence are emphasized by the
court's power on its own initiative:
(1) personally to inspect things or persons which are indispensable to ascertain the
truthfulness of facts, and
(2) to request parties to appear before it and question them about the action.
APPLICATION OF LAWS AND RESPONSES THERETO
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taken , and
at the same time 'utilizable' in the forum where the action will be
37
tried.
The foundation of the Convention is the necessity for international cooperation and accommodation. That this can in fact be achieved in important areas
is illustrated by the accommodation between U.S. discovery conducted by the
advocate and French discovery conducted by the judge. After France joined the
Evidence Convention, a new French Code of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1975,
allowed cross-examination of witnesses and a verbatim transcript when
requested under a foreign Letter of Request.38 These procedures are not
known in French domestic practice and were incorporated into French civil
procedure specifically to meet the needs of U.S. practice and, particularly, the
U.S. deposition.39
Turning now to final conclusions, it seems that the following specific and
significant benefits have been achieved in international litigation through the
Service and Evidence Conventions:
1. A procedure, certain and ascertainable, for instituting litigation has
been established by the Service Convention.
2. An internationally defined and enforceable standard of due process
with respect to service has been set forth in the Service Convention.
3. The problem of obtaining evidence from reluctant third-party
witnesses has been addressed in the Evidence Convention, and a
procedure, which could not be created unilaterally, for obtaining such
evidence has been established.
4. Witnesses testifying or producing documents pursuant to the Evidence
Convention have been assured by international agreement the protections and privileges afforded witnesses in both the forum state and the
state in which the testimony or documents are being sought.
Finally, the very existence of an organization such as the Hague Convention
on Private International Law must itself be viewed as a benefit to the
international community. The Convention has provided a forum for the
discussion of particular problems and has allowed international initiatives in
areas which otherwise might not have been addressed. Other articles in this
symposium address the Child Abduction Convention' and the cases for a
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Convention and a Foreign Judgment Convention." Who could provide a forum for such discussions superior to that of the
37. See Report of the United States Delegation to Eleventh Session of Hague Conference on Private
InternationalLaw, 8 I.L.M. 785, 806 (1969).
38. FR. C. PR. Civ., arts. 733-38.

39. See Adair Dyer, Note on the Aerospatiale Case, 77 REVUE
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AL PRIVt.575, 579-80 (1988).

40. Linda Silberman, Hague InternationalChild Abduction Convention: A ProgressReport, 57 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 209 (Summer 1994).

41. Joan E. Donoghue, The Public Face of Private InternationalLaw: Prospectsfor a Convention
on Foreign State Immunity, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 305 (Summer 1994); Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
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